A major problem in the consistent-histories approach to quantum theory is contending with the potentially large number of consistent sets of history propositions. One possibility is to find a scheme in which a unique set is selected in some way. However, in this paper we consider the alternative approach in which all consistent sets are kept, leading to a type of 'many world-views' picture of the quantum theory. It is shown that a natural way of handling this situation is to employ the theory of varying sets (presheafs) on the space B of all Boolean subalgebras of the orthoalgebra U P of history propositions. This approach automatically includes the feature whereby probabilistic predictions are meaningful only in the context of a consistent set of history propositions. More strikingly, it leads to a picture in which the 'truth values', or 'semantic values' of such contextual predictions are not just two-valued (i.e., true and false) but instead lie in a larger logical algebra-a Heyting algebra-whose structure is determined by the space B of Boolean subalgebras of U P.
Introduction
The consistent-histories approach to standard quantum theory was pioneered by Griffiths (1984) , Omnès (1988a Omnès ( , 1988b Omnès ( , 1988c Omnès ( , 1989 Omnès ( , 1990 Omnès ( , 1992 , Hartle (1990a, 1990b) and Hartle (1991 Hartle ( , 1995 and was motivated in part by a desire to find an interpretation of quantum theory that is less instrumentalist than is that of the standard 'Copenhagen' view. Such a move is particularly desirable in the context of quantum cosmology, where any reference to an 'external observer' seems singularly inappropriate. At a more technical level, the consistent-histories scheme provides an attractive framework in which to develop any views on quantum gravity where the microstructure of spacetime itself is deemed to be the subject of quantum effects. In particular, questions about the probabilities of various 'generalised' space-times being realised in the universe are difficult to pose and analyse in the more traditional approaches to quantum theory.
The central idea in the consistent-histories scheme is that (i) under certain conditions it is possible to assign probabilities to history propositions of a system rather than-as in standard quantum theory-only to propositions concerning properties at a fixed time; and (ii) these probabilities refer to 'the way things are' in some-as yet rather problematic-sense rather than to the results of possible measurements made by an observer from outside the system. A key ingredient in the theory is the 'decoherence function'-a complex-valued function d(α, β) of history propositions α, β that measures the 'quantum interference' between them. A complete 2 set of history propositions C := {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n } is said to be (strongly) d-consistent if d(α i , α j ) = 0 for all i = j, and under these circumstances the probability that α i will be realised is identified with the real number d(α i , α i ) (the formalism is such that these numbers always sum to 1 in a consistent set).
Whether or not this scheme really answers the interpretational questions in quantum theory has been much debated; for example Halliwell (1995) , Kent (1995, 1996) and Kent (1996) . The central problem is the existence of many d-consistent sets that are mutually incompatible in the sense that they cannot be combined to give a single larger set. An analogous situation arises in standard quantum theory but there the problem is resolved by the ubiquitous external observer deciding to measure one observable rather than another. However, this option is not available in the history framework and the problem must be addressed in some way that is internal to the theory itself.
A priori there are two quite different ways of approaching this plethora of dconsistent sets. The first is to try to select a unique one that is 'realised' in the actual physical world. This might involve some natural choice within the context of the existing framework, or it could mean looking for a new physical process. The former is typical of those approaches to the 'many worlds'-or, in some views, 'many Of course, the idea that probabilistic assertions must be made in the context of a d-consistent set is not new-the theme has run through the entire development of the histories programme and, in particular, has been re-emphasised recently by Griffiths (1993 Griffiths ( , 1996 . However, allowing the context to be a general complete set and, more dramatically, the use of a 'multi-valued' logic are new departures although, as I hope to show, they follow naturally from the mathematical structure of the consistent-histories formalism. Indeed, the basic idea is easy enough to state although its ramifications lead at once to concepts drawn from the sophisticated branch of mathematics known as 'topos 4 theory'.
To see how topos ideas arise, suppose that C is a complete set of history propositions that is not d-consistent: what would be the status of a probabilistic prediction made in this context? One response is "none at all", but a more physically appropriate observation is that even if C is not itself d-consistent it might admit a coarse-graining C ′ (i.e., a set of propositions, each of which is a sum of propositions in C) that is dconsistent and in which the probabilistic prediction does become meaningful; in other words, by agreeing to use less precise propositions we may arrive at a situation where probabilities can be assigned meaningfully. However, we then note that (i) any further coarse-grainings of C ′ will also be d-consistent; and (ii) there may be many such initial choices C ′ and the same holds for further coarse-grainings of any of them. In the language of topos theory this says that the collection of all d-consistent coarse-grainings of C forms a sieve on C with respect to the partial-ordering induced by coarse-graining.
3 For a recent review see Butterfield (1996) . 4 A topos is a special type of category. The relevant details are given further on in the paper.
The main idea is to assign this sieve as the 'truth value'-or, perhaps better, the 'meaning' or 'semantic value'-of a proposition in the context of C. The crucial fact that underpins this suggestion is that the set of all such sieves does indeed form a logical algebra, albeit one that contains more than just the values 'true' and 'false'.
The natural occurrence of sieves in the consistent-histories scheme is the primary motivation for claiming that topos theory-especially the theory of sets varying over a partially-ordered set-is the natural mathematical tool with which to probe the internal logic of this particular approach to quantum theory. Fortunately, for our purposes it is not necessary to delve too deeply 5 into this-rather abstract-branch of mathematics, and to facilitate the exposition the paper starts with a short summary of some of the relevant ideas about varying sets. This is followed by a discussion of the crucial poset 6 of all Boolean subalgebras of the quantum algebra of history propositions. We then come to the heart of the paper where the appropriate sets of semantic values for propositions in the consistent-histories programme are investigated. Some less central technical material is relegated to the appendices.
The Topos of Varying Sets

Second-level propositions
We begin with the simplest of remarks. In standard set theory, to each subset A of a set X there is associated a 'characteristic map' χ A : X → {0, 1} defined by
Conversely, any function χ : X → {0, 1} defines a unique subset A χ := χ −1 {1} of X whose characteristic function is equal to χ.
Next, consider a hypothetical classical theory whose basic ingredient is a Boolean lattice UP of propositions about the physical universe 7 . A 'pure state' σ of the system will give rise to a valuation on UP, i.e., a homomorphism V σ : UP → Ω from UP to the simplest Boolean algebra Ω := {0, 1} with '0' interpreted as 'false' and '1' as true. Thus a valuation is a characteristic map that is also a homomorphism between Boolean algebras.
5 I have deliberately avoided any serious use of category language in the main text of the paper but have added some more technical remarks in the footnotes. 6 The word 'poset' is an abbreviation for 'partially-ordered set'. 7 By 'universe' I mean the physical world with all its spatio-temporal aspects. Thus we are talking about 'generalised histories', not states of affairs at a fixed time. Now let us consider what a probabilistic version of such a theory might look like. In theories with a realist flavour-as is, arguably, the case with the consistent-histories programme-there is a temptation (to which I shall succumb) to interpret probability in the sense of 'propensity' rather than in terms of (intersubjective) states of knowledge or relative frequency of repeated measurements. In particular, the proposition "α ∈ UP is true with probability p" (to be denoted by α, p ) is to be read as saying that the state of affairs represented by α has an 'intrinsic tendency' to occur that is measured by the number p ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the referent of α, p is to be construed as being the universe 'itself' in some way rather than, in particular, our knowledge of the universe or the results of sequences of measurements. A proposition of this type will be labelled 'second-level by which I mean simply that it is a proposition about the universe that itself involves a proposition α ∈ UP.
At a mathematical level, we observe that to each probability measure µ on UP (a 'statistical state' of the system), and for each p ∈ [0, 1], there is associated the subset of all α ∈ UP such that µ(α) = p. In turn, this gives rise to the characteristic map χ µ,p : UP → {0, 1} defined by
as a particular example of the situation represented by (2.1).
Note that the characteristic map in (2.3) is not a valuation on UP-no role is played by the Boolean structure on UP which, in this situation, is regarded purely as a set. On the other hand, we can think of the second-level propositions α, p as generating a new logical algebra with respect to which each measure µ on UP produces a genuine {0, 1}-valued valuation V µ defined by
Thus, for example, the conjunction operation on these new propositions is defined to be such that, for all µ,
This leads naturally to the idea of two second-level propositions being µ-semantically equivalent if their V µ valuations are equal, and semantically equivalent if they are µ-semantically equivalent for all measures µ. For example, for all µ and all p ∈ [0, 1] we have
since µ(α) + µ(¬α) = 1 for all α ∈ UP. Hence α, p and ¬α, 1 − p are semantically equivalent for all p ∈ [0, 1]. A more complex example is given by the result that, for any disjoint propositions α and β (i.e., α ∧ β = 0),
which arises from the fact that µ(α∨β) = µ(α)+µ(β) for any such pair of propositions.
Thus we see that, if α∧β = 0, then α∨β, p and q∈[0,1] α, p−q ∧ β, q are semantically equivalent for all p ∈ [0, 1].
The situation in the consistent-histories programme is similar in many respects. Once again, there is an algebra UP of 'universe propositions' although-as part of a quantum theory-it is no longer Boolean. There are also second-level propositions of the type α, p , although the role of a probability measure µ : UP → IR is now taken by a decoherence function d : UP × UP → | C. However, the really significant new features of the consistent-histories theory are that (i) a proposition α, p is physically meaningful only in the context of a d-consistent set (or, as we shall see, any complete set) of histories; and (ii) as we shall show, the associated truth values, or semantic values, can be regarded as lying in an algebra that is larger than {0, 1}.
Sets through time
As an example 8 of how contexts and generalised semantic values can arise, consider a fixed set X of people who are all alive at some initial time, and whose bodies are preserved once they die (and who are still referred to as 'people' in that state). Thus if D(t) ⊆ X denotes the subset of dead people at any time t, then as t increases D(t) will clearly stay constant or increase, i.e., t 1 ≤ t 2 implies D(t 1 ) ⊆ D(t 2 ). Such a parameterised family of sets D(t), t ∈ IR, is an example of what has been called a "set through time" by those working in the foundations of topos theory; for example Lawvere (1975) , Bell (1988) , MacLane and Moerdijk (1992) . Now suppose that some members of our population are-in fact-immortal. Suppose also that the members of X are all philosophers with a nostalgic leaning towards logical positivism. Then what truth value should be assigned to the proposition "person x is mortal" if all truth statements are required to be verifiable in some operational sense? If death has already occurred by the time the proposition is asserted then, of course, the proposition is true (assuming that the deadness of a body is something that can be confirmed operationally). However, if x is alive the proposition cannot be said to be true-on the assumption that mortality of a living being cannot be verified operationally-but neither can it be denied, since even if x is numbered among the immortals there is no way of showing this. Thus we are lead to the notion of a 'stage of truth' as the context in which a proposition acquires meaning-in our case, the time t-and to the idea that the truth values of a statement at a stage t may not just lie in the set {0, 1}.
Of course, a dedicated verificationist will simply insist that the proposition "x is mortal" is meaningless if asserted at a time t 0 when x is not dead. However, topos theory provides a more positive answer that stems from the observation that there may be a later time t at which x does die, and then of course x ∈ D(t ′ ) for all times t ′ ≥ t. A key idea in the theory of sets-through-time is that the 'truth value'-or, perhaps better, the 'meaning' or 'semantic value'-at the stage t 0 of the proposition "x is mortal" is defined to be the set χ
(x) of all later times 9 t at which x is dead:
Note that if x never dies, i.e., if he or she is immortal, then the right hand side of (2.8) is just the empty set. On the other hand, x is dead at a time t if and only if
Equivalently, at stage t we have
When compared with (2.1), the relation (2.10) shows that the parameterised family of maps χ
where Ω(t 0 ) denotes the collection of all upper sets lying above t 0 ) is the analogue of the single characteristic function of normal set theory.
From a logical perspective, the crucial property of this set Ω(t 0 ) of all possible semantic values at stage t 0 is that it possesses the structure of a Heyting algebra. Thus Ω(t 0 ) is a distributive lattice with the property that for any a, b ∈ Ω(t 0 ) there is a unique element (a ⇒ b) ∈ Ω(t 0 ) (with the intuitive meaning "if a then b") satisfying
The negation operation in such an algebra is defined by ¬a := (a ⇒ 0), and satisfies the relation a ≤ ¬¬a for all a. 10 Indeed, it can be shown that a Heyting algebra is Boolean if and only if a = ¬¬a for all a.
Sets varying over a partially-ordered set
A key fact for our programme is that the ideas sketched above extend readily to the situation where the 'stages of truth' are elements of a general partially-ordered set P; for example, Bell (1988) . In our case, P will be the set of Boolean subalgebras of the space of quantum history propositions with W 1 ≤ W 2 defined to mean W 2 ⊆ W 1 (so that W 2 is a 'coarse-graining' of W 1 ). The necessary mathematical development is most naturally expressed in the language of category theory, although for our purposes all that is really needed is the idea that a category consists of a collection of things called 'objects'-mathematical entities with some precisely defined internal structure-and 'morphisms' between pairs of such objects, where a morphism is a type of structurepreserving 'map' (but not necessarily in the sense of set theory).
The relevant category for us is the category Set P of "varying sets over P". Here, an object X is defined to be an assignment to each p ∈ P of a set X(p), and an assignment to each pair p ≤ q of a map X pq : X(p) → X(q) such that (i) X pp is the identity map on X(p), and (ii) the following relations are satisfied
A morphism η : Y → X between two such objects Y, X in Set P is defined to be a family of maps η p : Y (p) → X(p), p ∈ P, satisfying the compatibility conditions
as shown in the commutative diagram
In particular, a subobject of a varying set 13 X = {X(p), p ∈ P} is a varying set A = {A(p), p ∈ P} with the property that A(p) ⊆ X(p) for all p ∈ P, and such that A pq : A(p) → A(q) is just the restriction of X pq : X(p) → X(q) to the subset A(p) ⊆ X(p). These relations are captured nicely by the commutative diagram
where the vertical arrows are subset inclusions.
11 What is being exploited here is the familiar fact that a poset P can be regarded as a category in its own right in which (i) the objects are the elements of P; and (ii) there are no morphisms p → q unless p ≤ q, in which case there is just one. A 'varying set over P' is then just a functor from the category P to the category 'Set' of normal sets. This is closely related to the concept of a 'presheaf' on P.
12 If P is regarded as a category then η is a 'natural transformation' between the functors Y and X. 13 The notation does not include a specific reference to the functions X pq : X(p) → X(q), but these are understood to be implicitly included.
A simple, but important, special case is when the varying set X(p) is in fact constant i.e., X(p) = X for all p ∈ P, and X pq is the identity map from X = X(p) to X = X(q) for all pairs p ≤ q. In this situation, each set A(p), p ∈ P, can be regarded as a subset of the fixed set X, and the condition on a varying set A := {A(p), p ∈ P} to be a bona fide subobject of X is simply that
This special case where X(p) is constant also gives rise to the varying-set analogue of a 'complement' of a subset. The obvious family of subsets of X to serve as the complement of {A(p), p ∈ P} is {X − A(p), p ∈ P}, but this does not give a proper varying set since p ≤ q implies X − A(p) ⊇ X − A(q), which is the wrong behaviour. It turns out that the appropriate definition is the genuine varying set ¬A := {¬A(p), p ∈ P} where
It follows that x ∈ ¬A(p) if and only if there is some q ≥ p such that x ∈ A(q), and hence
We see that A(p) ⊆ ¬¬A(p) whereas, in normal set theory, the double complement of a subset is always equal to the subset itself. This non-standard behaviour in the varying-set theory is a reflection of the fact that the underlying logical structure is non-Boolean (see later).
As in the case of sets through time, a key role is played by the collections Ω(p), p ∈ P, of all upper sets lying above p. More precisely, a sieve 14 on p in P is defined to be any subset S of P such that if r ∈ S then (i) r ≥ p, and (ii) r ′ ∈ S for all r ′ ≥ r. For each p ∈ P, the set Ω(p) of all sieves on p can be shown to be a Heyting algebra 15 , and for all pairs p ≤ q there is a natural map Ω pq : Ω(p) → Ω(q) defined by
where ↑(q) := {r ∈ P | r ≥ q} is the unit element in the Heyting algebra Ω(q) (the null element is the empty set). It is easy to see that, with the maps Ω pq in (2.19) , Ω := {Ω(p), p ∈ P} is a varying set over P and hence an object in the category Set P .
A very important example of the use of Ω occurs if A is a subobject of the object X. There is then an associated characteristic morphism χ A : X → Ω with, at each stage p ∈ P, the 'component' χ 2.20) where the fact that the right hand side of (2.20) actually is a sieve on p in P follows from the defining properties of a subobject. Thus in each 'branch' of the poset going up from p, χ A p (x) picks out the first member q (the "time till truth") in that branch for which X pq (x) lies in the subset A(q), and the commutative diagram (2.15) then guarantees that X pr (x) will lie in A(r) for all r ≥ q. In the special case where
In what follows, the expression (2.21) plays a crucial role as the analogue in the theory of varying sets of the characteristic map (2.1) χ A : X → {0, 1} of normal set theory. Indeed, the analogue of the relation (2.2) for the situation epitomised by (2.21 
at each stage p ∈ P. Conversely, each morphism χ : X → Ω defines a subobject of X (via (2.22)), and for this reason the object Ω in Set P is known as the subobject classifier in the category Set P ; the existence of such an object is one of the defining properties 16 for a category to be a topos, which Set P is. As the target of characteristic maps (i.e., the analogue of {0, 1} in normal set theory), Ω can be thought of as the 'object of truth values'-an assignation that is reinforced by the observation that Ω has an internal structure of a Heyting algebra. For example, the conjunction ∧ : Ω × Ω → Ω is defined to be the morphism in the category Set P whose components ∧ p : Ω(p) × Ω(p) → Ω(p), p ∈ P, are the conjunctions ∧ p in the 'local' Heyting algebras Ω(p); the other logical operations are defined in a similar way.
The main thesis of the present paper is that a situation closely analogous to the one sketched above arises naturally in the theory of consistent histories where the basic quantum ingredients are an orthoalgebra UP of history propositions and a specific decoherence function d. In particular, we have (i) the idea of a 'context' or a 'stage'; and (ii) the property that-at each such stage-the truth values lie in a Heyting algebra. As emphasised already, the key point in the formalism of consistent histories is that we are concerned with assertions of the type α, p ("the probability of the history proposition α ∈ UP is p") but these only have a physical meaning in the context of a particular d-consistent set of propositions to which α belongs or, to be more precise (see later), in the context of any set of propositions that can be coarse-grained to give a d-consistent set that contains α. It is technically convenient to employ the Boolean subalgebra of UP generated by a set of history propositions, rather than the set itself, and in this framework my thesis is essentially that
• each Boolean subalgebra W 0 of the set UP of all history propositions can serve as a possible 'stage'; and
• the truth value (or semantic value) of α, p at a particular stage W 0 is related to the collection of all coarse-grainings W of W 0 that contain α and are d-consistent.
As we shall see, the implementation of this idea involves a specific application of the idea of sets varying over a poset, and hence we do indeed obtain a Heyting algebra of possible semantic values at each stage. Moreover, we will show how propositions of the type α, p can be associated with Ω-valued morphisms; as such, they belong to the internal logic (and, indeed, formal language) that is associated with the topos Set B where B denotes the poset of all Boolean subalgebras of UP (see below for details). Thus the internal logic of the topos provides a framework for understanding the logical structure of probabilistic predictions in a consistent-histories theory in a way that automatically includes all possible contextual references to d-consistent sets. We thereby arrive at a coherent logical structure for this particular 'many world-views' picture of quantum theory.
Boolean Subalgebras of Propositions
The general formalism of consistent histories
In the general approach to the consistent-history formalism developed by Isham (1994) and , the central mathematical ingredient is a pair (UP, D) where UP is an orthoalgebra 17 of 'history propositions' and D is the space of decoherence functions defined on this algebra (for a short summary of the scheme see Isham, 1995) .
It should be emphasised from the outset that, in practice, the orthoalgebra formalism is much less abstract than it might appear at first. In particular, for any given physical system it is always appropriate to consider the possibility that UP may simply be the algebra P (V) of projection operators on some Hilbert space V; in this case, α ⊕ β is defined if and only if αβ = 0, and then α ⊕ β = α + β. For example, it was shown in Isham (1994) that the history version of normal quantum theory for, say, a finite number of time points {t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n } can be cast into this form. Specifically, the history propositions are identified as projection operators on the tensor product space H t 1 ⊗ H t 2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H tn where each H t i is a copy of the Hilbert space of states H of 17 An orthoalgebra UP is a partially-ordered set with greatest element 1 and least element 0 and for which there is a notion of when two elements α, β are orthogonal , denoted α ⊥ β. If α and β are such that α ⊥ β then they can be combined to give a new element α ⊕ β ∈ UP. Furthermore, α ≤ β if and only if β = α ⊕ γ for some γ ∈ UP. There is also a negation operation with α ⊕ ¬α = 1 (for the full definition of an orthoalgebra see Foulis, Greechie and Rüttimann, 1992) . It should be noted that the structure of an orthoalgebra is much weaker than that of a lattice. In the latter there are two connectives ∧ and ∨, both of which are defined on all pairs of elements, unlike the single, partial, operation ⊕ in an orthoalgebra. A lattice is a special type of orthoalgebra with α ⊕ β being defined on disjoint lattice elements α, β (i.e., those for which α ≤ ¬β) as α ⊕ β := α ∨ β.
standard canonical quantum theory. The extension of this idea to a continuous time variable is discussed in Isham and Linden (1995) .
Returning to the general formalism we recall that a decoherence function is a map d : UP × UP → | C that satisfies the following conditions:
3. Additivity: if α ⊥ β (i.e., α and β are orthogonal) then, for all
Note that the additivity condition implies that, for all α ∈ UP,
We also note that, as shown by Isham, Linden and Schreckenberg (1994) , in the concrete case where UP = P (V) for some Hilbert space V every decoherence function can be written in the form
where X belongs to a precisely specified class of operators on V ⊗ V.
Following Gell-Mann and Hartle, a finite set C := {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α N } of non-zero propositions is said to be complete if (i) α i ⊥ α j for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N; (ii) the elements of C are 'jointly compatible', i.e., they belong to some Boolean subalgebra of UP; and (iii) α 1 ⊕ α 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ α N = 1. In algebraic terms, a complete set of history propositions is simply a finite partition of unity in the orthoalgebra UP.
It should be noted that in the history version of standard quantum theory, the decoherence function for a particular system depends on both the initial state and the Hamiltonian. Thus, in general, for any specific history system the decoherence function d will be one particular element of D. It must be emphasised that only d-consistent sets of history propositions are given an immediate physical interpretation. A complete set C of history propositions is said to be 18 d-consistent if d(α, β) = 0 for all α, β ∈ C such that α = β. Under these circumstances d(α, α) is regarded as the probability that the history proposition α is true. The axioms above then guarantee that the usual Kolmogoroff probability rules are satisfied on the Boolean algebra generated by C.
It is worth noting that the idea of an orthoalgebra is closely related to that of a Boolean manifold : an algebra that is 'covered' by a collection of maximal Boolean subalgebras with appropriate compatibility conditions on any pair that overlap (Hardegree and Frazer, 1982) . Being Boolean, these subalgebras of propositions carry a logical structure that is essentially classical: a feature of the consistent-histories scheme that was focal in the seminal work of Griffiths and Omnès and that has been re-emphasised recently by Griffiths (1993 Griffiths ( , 1996 . In the approach outlined above, these Boolean algebras are glued together from the outset to form an orthoalgebra UP of propositions from which the physically interpretable subsets are selected by the consistency conditions with respect to a chosen decoherence function.
Any partition of unity C := {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α N } generates a Boolean algebra whose elements are the finite 19 ⊕-sums of elements of C (hence the elements of C are atoms of this algebra). If C is d-consistent, and if α := ⊕ i∈I 1 α i and β := ⊕ j∈I 2 α j are two members of the algebra (where I 1 and I 2 are subsets of the index set {1, 2, . . . , N}) then, by the additivity property of the decoherence function d,
On the other hand
and so
for all α, β.
In a general orthoalgebra UP not every Boolean subalgebra is necessarily generated by a partition of unity-for example, any Boolean subalgebra that is not atomic falls in this class. Partly for this reason it is helpful to define consistency for Boolean algebras per se, rather than go via partitions of unity. However, it is also pedagogically useful to do so as it emphasises the essentially 'classical' nature of the properties of the propositions in a d-consistent set. The set of all Boolean subalgebras of UP is denoted B and, motivated by (3.5), we propose the following definition: The relation of this definition to the earlier one of strong consistency is contained in the following lemma.
Lemma The condition (3.5) on all elements α, β in a Boolean subalgebra W is equivalent to d(α, β) = 0 for all α, β ∈ W such that α ⊥ β. Conversely, suppose (3.6) is true and let α, β ∈ W . Then there exist jointly orthogonal elements α 1 , β 1 , γ 1 ∈ W such that α = α 1 ⊕ γ and β = β 1 ⊕ γ. Indeed, we can choose α 1 := α ∧ ¬β, β 1 := β ∧ ¬α and γ := α ∧ β, where the general lattice operation ∧ is well defined in this Boolean subalgebra. Then, by the additivity property of the decoherence function,
since (3.6) means that
In what follows I shall refer to a Boolean subalgebra of UP as a window in order to convey the idea that it affords a potential way of 'looking' at the physical world; the initial letter 'w' also serves to remind us that a window can be regarded as a possible 'world-view', or even 'weltanschauung'. A d-consistent window is what Griffiths (1996) calls a 'framework'.
Key features of the space B of Boolean subalgebras
At this point it is useful to recall a number of standard properties possessed by B that will be important in what follows.
1. B is a partially ordered set with respect to subset inclusion, and we write W 1 ≤ W 2 if W 1 ⊇ W 2 (we define W 1 ≤ W 2 in this way rather than as W 1 ⊆ W 2 in order to be consistent with our earlier discussion of sets varying over a poset). For such a pair W 1 ≤ W 2 we say that (i) W 1 is a fine-graining of W 2 ; and (ii) W 2 is a coarse-graining of W 1 (for convenience, this terminology includes the idea that any window W ∈ B is both a coarse-graining and a fine-graining of itself). We note that (a) the greatest element of (B, ≤) is {0, 1};
(b) there is no least element (because there exist many quantum propositions α, β ∈ UP that are not compatible, i.e., α and β cannot be members of the same Boolean algebra) but by Zorn's lemma each descending 20 chain of windows has a minimal element. 20 To avoid confusion note that a chain · · · ≤ W 2 ≤ W 1 ≤ W 0 of windows that is descending with respect to the ≤ ordering is an ascending chain W 0 ⊆ W 1 ⊆ W 2 · · · with respect to subalgebra inclusion.
2.
A join operation can be defined on the poset (B, ≤) by Let us now recall the earlier discussion of sets varying over a poset while making the following key definitions.
Definition 3.2
1. A sieve on W 0 ∈ B in B is a subset (possibly empty) S of windows in B such that
Thus a sieve on W 0 is an upper set in (B, ≤) all of whose elements are coarsegrainings of W 0 .
The set of all sieves on W 0 is denoted Ω(W 0 ).
The following properties of sieves are crucial for our purposes.
1. For each W 0 , the set Ω(W 0 ) of all sieves on W 0 in B is a partially-ordered set with S 1 ≤ S 2 being defined as S 1 ⊆ S 2 . The greatest element 1 is the principal sieve
and the least element 0 is the empty subset of windows.
2. The poset Ω(W 0 ) is a distributive lattice with the operations (i) S 1 ∧S 2 := S 1 ∩S 2 ; and (ii) S 1 ∨ S 2 := S 1 ∪ S 2 . In fact Ω(W 0 ) is a Heyting algebra, i.e., given sieves S 1 and S 2 there is a sieve (S 1 ⇒ S 2 ) such that
This sieve is defined as
In a Heyting algebra, the negation of an element x is defined by ¬x := (x ⇒ 0). Thus, for a sieve S on W 0 ,
As explained earlier, a central idea in the internal logic of varying sets is that the Heyting algebra Ω(W 0 ) serves as the space of semantic values for propositions at the stage W 0 .
3. The collection Ω := {Ω(W ), W ∈ B} is a set varying over B under the definition, for all pairs W 1 ≤ W 2 (i.e., W 2 ⊆ W 1 ),
We can also define the sets of d-consistent sieves (3.14) and note that, like Ω,
Finally, although no explicit use of it will be made here, we note that another simple example of a set varying over (B, ≤) is given by {D W , W ∈ B} where D W is defined to be the set of all decoherence functions for which W is a d-consistent window:
This is a genuine object in Set B since if W 2 is a coarse-graining of W 1 (i.e.,
Semantic Values in Consistent Histories
Realisable propositions
We come now to the main task of the paper: to formulate precisely the idea that a second-level proposition like α, p ("the probability of the history proposition α being true is p") has a meaning only in the context of a window, and with a semantic value that belongs to some logical structure associated with that window-in particular, we anticipate that a semantic value can be identified with a sieve on the window.
Let us start by considering what is necessary for a proposition α, p to have any meaning at all in the context of a particular window W and for a given decoherence function d. Perhaps the simplest position to adopt here is that in order to be able to 'realise' α in the context of W , the history proposition α must belong to the Boolean algebra W , and W must be d-consistent.
21 This suggests the following definition:
is the set of all 22 propositions that are d-realisable in W .
Continuing to reason in this heuristic way, we could argue next that even if a window W 0 is not d-consistent, the proposition α, p still has a meaning at stage W 0 provided that a coarse-graining W of W 0 exists in which α is d-realisable. However, there may be many such coarse-grainings, and the focal idea of the paper is that this should be reflected by assigning an appropriate semantic value to α, p -in the present case, a natural choice would be the set of all coarse grainings of W 0 in which α is d-realisable (on the assumption that d(α, α) = p; if not, the semantic value is deemed to be the empty set). In other words, we tentatively assign to the second-level proposition α, p the semantic value at stage W 0 defined as
which would make sense provided that the set of all such semantic values belongs to some logical algebra.
However, this assignment does not work in the way we have been anticipating because the right hand side of (4.2) is generally not a sieve on W 0 (because if W 21 Of course, it could be that d(α, α) = 0, but the statement that the state of affairs described by the history proposition α has zero probability is still a positive prediction about the universe.
22 This definition has the property that even the 0 and 1 history propositions are deemed not to be d-realisable in a window that is not d-consistent. Of course, this does affect the fact that, for all
α, p , then any W ′ ⊂ W with α ∈ W ′ will not do so). Thus we cannot identify the set of possible semantic values with the Heyting algebra of the space of sieves. In itself this does not rule out the use of (4.2) but it implies that any logical structure on the set of semantic values must be obtained in a way that is different from our anticipated use of the topos of varying sets Set B . One possibility is sketched in the first appendix.
Accessible propositions
The problem with the suggested semantic value V d W 0 α, p can be seen from a somewhat different perspective by noting that
, W ∈ B} does not define a proper varying set over B. This is because increasing the size of the window W (i.e., finegraining it) increases the number of propositions contained in W -which suggests that 
, W ∈ B} to be a varying set.
Note that a genuine varying set can be obtained by the simple expedient of replacing the condition α ∈ W in (4.1) by α ∈ W . This gives rise to a new concept: namely of a proposition α being 'unrealisable', but this is not what we are seeking and therefore further discussion is relegated to an appendix where it serves as a particularly simple example of what is meant by an object in the topos Set B .
Evidently a new idea is needed of what it means to say that a proposition α is 'realisable' in a window W . On reflection, do we really require that α actually belongs to W ? Surely it suffices if W can be extended (i.e., fine-grained) to a bigger d-consistent window that does contain α?
This new concept differs subtly from the earlier version of 'realisability' and the terminology should reflect this. We are thus lead to introduce a new family of second-level propositions of the form "α is d-accessible" where α ∈ UP. As with the second-level propositions α, p , there is no reference to windows per se, and I shall indicate this by referring to propositions of this type as global. However, the key idea we wish to develop is that-as hinted at above in the example of d-realisability-in order to interpret a global proposition within the framework of the consistent-histories programme it is first necessary to 'localise' it by constructing secondary versions that do refer to windows. Then we can introduce the notion of the 'semantic value at a stage W 0 ' of the global proposition, and we find that it does indeed lie in a Heyting algebra. The aim is to use the topos-theoretic ideas discussed earlier so that, in particular, the Heyting algebra appropriate to a stage W 0 is the set Ω(W 0 ) of sieves on W 0 in (B, ≤).
We begin with the following definition of the 'localised' version of the new family of global propositions "α is d-accessible", denoted α, A d .
Definition 4.2
A proposition α ∈ UP is d-accessible from a window W if there exists
is the set of all propositions that are d-accessible from W . Note that this can be rewritten as
where R d (W ) was defined in (4.1). Thus a proposition α is d-accessible from a window W if and only if there exists some fine-graining
The following properties of these sets are crucial for our purposes.
, and hence, unlike the case for R d , the collection
defined as subset inclusion. In this sense, 'accessibility' works while 'realisability' fails. As we shall see, this new object A d in Set B is the crucial ingredient in my topos-based semantics for interpreting the second-level propositions α, p in the consistent-histories programme. which, according to (2.21) , is defined at any stage W 0 by (c.f., (2.8))
The varying set
where, as can readily be checked, the right hand side is a bona fide sieve on W 0 .
The sieve on the right hand side of (4.6)-which actually belongs to the subset is still ascribed a semantic value at stage W 0 that is generically not the null element 0 (the empty sieve) of the Heyting algebra Ω(W 0 ): namely, the set of all coarse-grainings W of W 0 from which α is d-accessible. Thus the semantic value at stage W 0 of the global proposition "α is d-accessible" is a measure of the extent to which W 0 needs to be changed in order that α does become d-accessible from it. Hence coarse-graining a window is the analogue in the consistent-histories theory of choosing a later time in the example of sets-through-time discussed earlier (compare (4.7) with (2.9)).
A key role for Ω is to impart a logical structure to the collection of all global propositions, and the first step in this direction is to note that (4.6) can be used to define what is known in the topos literature as a global element of the object Ω, i.e., a morphism 1 → Ω in Set B where 1 is the terminal object 25 in Set B defined by 1(W ) := { * } (the set with one element) for all W ∈ B. Specifically, for each α ∈ UP we defineχ
where the right hand side is given by (4.6). In turn, this produces a map
where Hom Set B (1, Ω) denotes the set of morphisms from 1 to Ω in the topos category Set B .
By these means, to each global proposition α, A d we can associate a corresponding 'valuation' morphism V α,
is a global element of Ω; i.e., V is a map from global propositions to global elements. In normal set theory, a map from { * } (the terminal object in the category of sets) to a set X picks out a unique element of X, and (4.10)
24 This is not a coincidence: fuzzy set theory can be viewed as a sub-branch of topos theory. 25 An object 1 is said to be a terminal object in a category if there is just one morphism from any other object to 1; it is easy to see that any two terminal objects are isomorphic. In the category of sets a terminal object is any set { * } with just a single element. In this case a morphism is just a map, and hence a morphism { * } → X picks out a unique element of X. 26 We are exploiting here the fact that the constant presheaf functor ∆ : Set → Set B is left adjoint to the 'global sections' functor Γ : Set B → Set where, for any object F in Set B , we have ΓF := Hom Set B (1, F ). This adjointness relation gives rise to a natural isomorphism Hom Set B (∆S, F ) ≃ Hom Set (S, ΓF ) for any set S. In our case the set S is UP and the functor F is Ω; thus the isomorphism of interest is Hom Set B (∆UP, Ω) ≃ Hom Set (UP, ΓΩ). The element in Hom Set B (∆UP, Ω) with which we are concerned is χ can be regarded as the analogue of this procedure in the category Set B of varying sets. Thus (4.10) encapsulates the idea that in our topos interpretation of the consistenthistories formalism, a 'generalised truth value' is associated to each global proposition α, A d -namely the global element V α, A d : 1 → Ω of Ω.
Referring to (4.10) as a 'valuation' seems to imply that it preserves some logical structure on the propositions α, A d . However, we do not have any such structure a priori : rather, the intention of (4.10) is to use the Heyting algebra structure of Ω to define a logical algebra on the global propositions α, 
where ∧ : Ω×Ω → Ω is the 'and' operation in the Heyting algebra structure on Ω. This is a rather sophisticated analogue of the treatment of α, p ∧ β, q by the expression (2.5) in the context of our earlier discussion of second-level propositions in a classical theory.
Note however that the mapχ A d in (4.9) is not one-to-one, and hence neither is the valuation map α, A d → V α, A d that associates a global element of Ω with each α, A d . Thus-analogous again to our discussion in section 2.1 of classical second-level propositions-we are lead to define two global propositions as being d-semantically equivalent if they are associated with the same global element of Ω (with a given decoherence function d): properly speaking, it is only to the equivalence classes of such propositions that the logical algebra applies.
For example, although in the construction (4.6) the quantity ∆UP is regarded purely as a set and the orthoalgebra structure plays no a priori role, neverthelesssince W is a Boolean subalgebra of UP-if α ∈ W then ¬α ∈ W and vice versa. Hence α ∈ W if and only if ¬α ∈ W , which implies that, for all α ∈ UP,
(4.12)
Thus α, A d and ¬α, A d are d-semantically equivalent 28 for any α ∈ UP and for all decoherence functions d.
The semantic values for α, p
Finally we are in a position to treat the main goal of the paper, namely propositions of the type α, p -"the probability of history proposition α being true is p". All we have to do is to supplement the requirement of d-accessibility with the additional condition d(α, α) = p. Thus I propose to interpret the global proposition α, p by specifying it to have the following 'localised' form:
These sets obey the basic condition
The varying set A d,p is a subobject of the constant varying set ∆UP, and hence for each decoherence function d (an analogue of the state σ that arises in (2.3)) and each p ∈ [0, 1] we get the crucial characteristic morphism χ d,p : ∆UP → Ω in Set B whose components are the maps χ
The right hand side of (4.14) is a genuine sieve and is to be regarded as the semantic value at stage W 0 of the global proposition α, p "the state of affairs represented by the history proposition α ∈ UP has probability p of occurring".
As was the case with α, A d , the global proposition α, p can be associated with a global elementχ
Putting together these various results we finally arrive at the desired 'valuation morphism'
The topos result (4.16) should be compared with the simple expression (2.4) that applies in a more conventional probability theory. Once again we see the 'fuzzy-set' nature of the topos scheme in the sense that at any particular stage W 0 the proposition α, p may be assigned a semantic value other than 0 := ∅ or 1 :=↑(W 0 ).
As in the earlier example of the second-level propositions α, A d , it is appropriate to define two global propositions α, p and β, q to be 'd-semantically-equivalent' if they are associated with the same global element of Ω, i.e., if their semantic values are equal in all windows. For example, it is clear from (4.16) that, for all decoherence functions d, the second-level propositions α, p and ¬α, 1 − p are d-semantically equivalent for all α ∈ UP and all p ∈ [0, 1]. This is because if α belongs to some window W ′ then so does ¬α. Furthermore, if W ′ is d-consistent then d(α, ¬α) = 0 and hence, by additivity of the decoherence function d,
By these means, the (equivalence classes of) global propositions of the type α, p generate a logical algebra as a subalgebra of the Heyting algebra on the set Hom Set B (1, Ω) of global elements of Ω in Set B . The expression (4.15)-with its component version (4.16)-represents the final form of our analysis of the logical structure of the consistent-history propositions "the probability that α ∈ UP is realised is p" in the context of topos theory.
Conclusions
A key ingredient in the consistent-histories formulation of quantum theory is the existence of d-consistent sets of propositions. We have argued that, in the approach where a preferred set is not selected once and for all, the ensuing many world-views semantics can be described mathematically with a topos-theoretic framework based on the idea of sets varying over the partially-ordered set B of all Boolean subalgebras of the orthoalgebra of history propositions. In particular, we have seen how a global proposition such as "the probability of the history proposition α being true is p" can be interpreted in a way that identifies any window W 0 ∈ B as a potential 'stage' and where the semantic values at each such stage lie in a Heyting algebra. This situation stems from the central claim that each global proposition can be identified with a global element 1 → Ω of the space Ω of truth values in the topos category Set B . Propositions of this type in the consistent-histories programme include α, A d , α, p and (as discussed in the second appendix) α, U d . The collection of d-semantic equivalence classes of all 29 such propositions generates a logical structure that is inherited from that of Ω. It should be emphasised once more that, in practice, the space UP may simply be the set of projection operators on some Hilbert space, in which case the analysis of the crucial poset B is a viable concrete task. The general conclusion of this paper is that topos methods provide a natural mathematical framework in which to discuss the inner logical structure that lies behind ideas of many windows, or world-views, in the quantum theory of histories. One general aim of this approach is to avoid the instrumentalism that dominates much conventional thinking about quantum theory although-as is not infrequently the case-it is difficult to give a simple physical picture of what the formalism means in these circumstances. However, if we accept the idea that 'classical realism' is associated in some way with a Boolean algebra of propositions, then we have to say that-because of its intrinsic Heyting algebra logic-the 'many windows' interpretation of the decoherent histories formalism corresponds to a type of neo-realism that, on the one hand, is more complicated and subtle than the simple realism of classical physics but which, on the other hand, does not go as far as the non-distributive structure that characterises quantum logic proper. Of course, this does not affect the the fact that the underlying orthoalgebra UP of history propositions is a genuine quantum logic.
In the context of 'many world-views' it is worth noting that the concept of a proposition being 'd-accessible' from a window W clearly extends to Boolean subalgebras in general: i.e., we can say that a window W ′ is d-accessible from a window W if there exists a d-consistent window W ′′ that contains both W ′ and W ; a single proposition α is then d-accessible from W in the sense of (4.3) if and only if the window {0, 1, α, ¬α} is d-accessible from W in the sense just described. However, this is just the consistenthistories analogue of the idea of 'relative possibility' introduced by Kripke (1963) in his original study of the semantics of intuitionistic modal logic (see also Loux, 1979) . This suggests that modal concepts such as 'necessity' or 'possibility' should find a natural home in the quantum formalism of consistent histories, but this remains a topic for future work.
The topos-theoretic ideas used in the present paper are rather elementary, being essentially restricted to the theory of presheafs on a poset, and there is a lot more to the subject than that. However, even at the simple level of the theory of varying sets it seems clear that the ideas discussed here could find applications in other areas of quantum theory where some type of contextuality arises. An example might be the idea of 'relational quantum theory' that has been actively developed recently by several authors; for example Crane (1995) , Smolin (1995) and Rovelli (1995) . It also seems possible that the well-known contextuality of truth values in standard quantum theory (i.e., the Kochen-Specker theorem) could be explored profitably from this perspective. A simple way of using these sets to generate a logical algebra follows from the following observation. There is a well known topology (the Vietoris topology) that can be placed on the set of all closed subsets of a topological space and which involves trapping sets, rather as in (A.3) . Motivated by what is done in the Vietoris situation the natural procedure in our case is to define a topology τ d on B by taking as a subbasis the collection of all sets of the form T Notice that this procedure does indeed produce a logical structure since the collection of open sets in any topological space is always a Heyting algebra. However, this is rather far from our original idea of presheafs on the partially-ordered set (B, ≤) and needs to be treated as a separate theory.
B Unrealisable Propositions
The 'localised' form of a new, and rather simple, global proposition "α is d-unrealisable" (denoted α, U d ) is given by the following definition.
